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~Abstract
In this paper we will study the impac[ of both corporate and personal
taxation on the optimal evolution pattern of a firm. The firm is
described by an optimal control model. It may attract two kinds of money
capital: equity by retaining earnings and debt. We will discuss the suc-
cessive stages in the evolution of the firm, derive some optimal deci-
siun rules and sltow the similarities with the theory of 'financial
leverage clienteles'.
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Dynami-c Eirm behaviour and financial leverage clienteles
G.J.C.Th. van Schijndel
l. Introduction
The effect of corporate taxes on the market value of a levered firm con-
tinues to be a central issue in recent contributions in finance theory.
After the publication of the Modígliani h Miller (1963) tax correction
paper many writers have sought to reconcile the MfiM maximum leverage
prediction with observed capital structure. .
Although the idea of financial leverage clienteles has appeared in
literature before Miller (1977) used it to argue that personal taxes
could offset corporate taxes such that in equilibrium the value of any
individual firm would be independent of its leverage. This approach
caused a stream of contributions like Kim, Lewellen fi McConnel (1979),
DeAngelo 6 Masulis (1980) and Kim (1982), studying and extending the
Miller-hypothesis that companies following a low leverage strategy would
find a market along investors ín high tax brackets and the stock of
higlily levered firms would be held by investors with low personal tax
rates.
The purpose of this paper is to add another dimension to this discus-
sion: dynamics. As the survey of Feichtinger (1982a) and the collections
of T3ensoussan, Kleindorfer S~ Tapiero (1978) and Feichtinger (1982b) very
well show many recent papers extend the theory of the firm using optimal
control techniques to solve real dynamic models in an analytical way.
Those models provide insight of the relevance of time and the evolution
of variables in course of time.
According to the first part of this introduction our research is related
to the fínancial models like those of Lesourne (1973), Leland (1972),
Sethi (1978), Van Loon (1983) and the survey of Lesourne S Leban (1982),
which are dealing with the dynamic problems of finance, dívidend and
investment. Although many authors are aware of the disturbing influencez
personal taxation possibly provides, they do not care. Research to this
vubji~ct has heen dunc by Yl~i-LLedi~npoh,ja (1978), but assuminK an in-
finite time horizon and taken deht financing not especíally into account
a niimber of interesting topics are left out of consideration.
So, the aim of this contribution is to extend this part of the dynamic
theory by introducing both corporate and personal taxation in a way we
can transfer the discussion of financial leverage clienteles into a dy-
namic environment.
In section 2, therefore, we will describe a deterministic dynamic model
of a firm which behaves as if it maximizes its value conceived by tax
homogeneous shareholders. We will distinguish different personal and
corporate tax rates. Using Optimal Control theory an analytical solution
of the problem will be derived in section 3. The sections 4 and 5 pre-
sent an economic interpretation and a further analysis of the results.
As we distinguish personal tax rates on capital gain and dividend income
the firm turns out be able to invest in projects with a net retiirn less
than the discountrate of the shareholders. Besides this, the firm will
at last finance all investments with only equity even when debt
financing is cheap compared to equity. Finally in section 6 we will
present the results of a sensitivity analysis concerning parameter.s that
are interesting for economíc analysis such as the personal tax rates and
the discount rate. This analysis will also illustrate the similarity
with the Miller-hypothesis.
2. The model
In the deterministic model of the firm, we will present in this section,
the firm concerned has only one production factor: capital goods K. The
f irm may attract two kinds of money capital, equity X and debt Y, so
from the balance sheet we derive that
(1) K(T) - X(T) t Y(T)
in which
T - time.3
We further assume that the firm is operating under decreasing returns to
scale caused by the imperfect outp~it markets and~or increasíng marginal
costs of organizing the production due to the increasing scale of the
Eirm. Therefore, revenue before interest and taxation is a concave fun-
ction of the amount of capi[al goods. No transaction costs are incurred
when borrowing or paying off debt money, corporate tax is proportional
[o profit and is paid at once. Issues of new shares are not allowed.
Earnings after corporate taxation are used to issue dividends or to in-
crease the value of equity through retained earnings:
(2) X :- dT - (1-rc)I~(K)-rY) - D
in which
0(K) - operating i ncome, i .e. revenue before interest and cor-
2
porate taxation, 0(K) ~ 0, áK ~ p~ d 0~ D
dK
D(T) - dividend payments
T - corporate tax rate
c
r - market i nterest rate.
Depreciation is assumed to be proportional to capital goods. The impact
of investments on the prodiictíon capacity is described by the general




dT - I - aK
I(T) - gross investments
a - depreciation rate.
Next we will limit the amount of debt. (hi page 58 of his book Ludwig
(1978) represents an interesting summary of alternative ways to formu-
late the limits of borrowing. Gte will introduce an upperbound on debt in
terms of a maximum debt of equity rate:
(4) Y ~ hX4
in which
h- maximum debt to eduity rate.
Together with the interest rate r this is a way to deal with uticertainty
within the framework of a deterministic model. Because the level of r is
an indication of the risk class to which the firm belongs expression (4)
may be conceived as a condition on the financial structure of the firm
that must be fulfilled in order to stay in the relevant risk-class (see
Van Loon (1983)).
The shareholders of the firm are assumed to have personal tax rates on
dividend Td and capital gain Tg such that the ratio (1-Tg)~(1-Td) is the
same for all shareholders. This case occurs e.g. if investor and manager
are one and the same person.
Finally we assume that the firm behaves as if it maximizes the share-
holders' value of the firm. As we like to separate dividend income and
capital gain explicitly this value consists in the tradition of Ludwig
(1978) and Van Loon (1983) of the present value of the net dividend
stream plus the net discounted gain on equity at the end of the planning
period:
(5) max (1-td) JzD(T)e-iTdT t X(z)e-iz - Tg(X(z)-X(0))e-iz
I,Y,D T-0
in which
Td - personal tax rate on dividend
T- personal tax rate on capital gain
8
z - planning horizon
i- díscount rate of the shareholder after personal taxation.
Formulating the objective in this way not only the difference between
the value of the personal tax rates will be of crucial importance but
also the time lag expressed by the discountrate. In accordance with most
of the tax regimes the tax rate on dividend is assumed to exceed the tax
rate on capítal gain.5
Following the above discussion we may formulate the optimization problem
for the firm as follows:
z
(6) max (1-T ) J D(T)e-iTdT t (1-T )X(z)e-iz
I,Y,D d T'0 g




3. Additiunal conditions for optimality
The model as formulated in paragraph 2 can be solved in an analytical
way by usiug 'optimal control' techniques. The state of the system is
described by the amount of equity and capital and is controlled by in-
vestments, dividends and the amount of debt. The aim of this control is
tu reach a maximum value of the objective function.
To solve the model we will use the procedure of Van Loon (1983), which
is based on the maximum principle of Russak (1970). This method is con-
venient because the model also contains state-constraints.
To rivoid non interesting stages we make following assumptions:
(12) íf K(T) - 0 then (1-TC) dK ~ max {(1-rc)r,i}
The marginal revenue of the first product to be sold exceeds
each of the financial costs implying that the firm will con-
sider only those alternatives that are profitable from the
start.6
(13) i ~ (1-rc)r
In this way we avoid degenerated solutions. Moreover it is co-
incidental when the discount rate and the net cost of debt
equal each other. Since a determínistic framework without taxa-
tion requires equality between the discount rate and the in-
terest rate we rewrite in the tradition of Brealey á~ Myers
(1981) expression (13) into:
(1-rr)r ~ (1-rc)r
in which
rr - personal tax rate on interest.
So in fact only the case rr - rc is excluded by assianption
(14) Finaly we assume that the firm owns a certain initial amount of
equity and debt such that
Y(0) - hX(0)
X(0) f Y(0) - K(0) ~ 0
To avoid jumps in state variables X and K we need a closed control
region by putting artificial boundaries to dividend and investments. We
assume however that these control variables never pass these sufficien-
tly large boundary values and therefore we omit them.
The necessary and in our case also sufficient conditions acquiring an
optimal solution are presented in the appendix. Based on these condi-
tions we may discern a number of different paths or stages, each charac-
terized by its own combination of active and inactive restrictions. A1-
though the complementary slackness conditions allow eight different com-
binations this number will be reduced to five by assumptions (12)
through (14). In the next section we will discuss these remaining
stages.7
4. Feasible paths and optimal trajectories
As each path is characterized by its own combination of active and in-
active restrictions, i.e. non-zero and zero artificial and Lagrange-
parame[ers, its properties can be represented by different policies con-
cerning capital structures, growth speed and~or dividend payments. A1-
though we have derived this characteristic properties in an analytical
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i ~ (1-T )r
c
i ~ (1-t )r
c
Tab]-e 1: Characteristic propertíes of feasible paths.
(Definition of the variables ul, UZ and a in the appendix.)
in which
~
K - KI'X ~ (1-TC) dK - (1-TC)r
~
K - 1~ - (1-TC) áK - i
~
k- KY -(1-rc)
dK - lfh 1} 1-~h
(1-TC)r
A c~mplete economic interpretation is presented on the next page, where
the coupling of stages to master trajectories is described. As an
example we derive from table 1 that path 1 has excellent possibilities
for growth. Under this policy the firm will attract as much debt as
possible, retain all earnings and invest this money in order to realize
a maximum increase of the amount of equity.
By now we like to couple these different stages in order to ob[ain op-
timal evolution patterns. A convenient method to handle this problem is8
that of Van Loon (1983) implying like dynamic programming a start at the
end of the planning period: first we search for feasible final sta~;es
and secondly for previous stages (for examples see the appendix). A
feasible final paths satisfies the so-called 'transversality condi-










i ~ (1-TC)r and 1 ~ (I-Tg)I(1-Td) ~ i~(1-TC)r
i ~ (1-T )r and
c
i ~ (1-r )r and
c
i ~ (1-TC)r and
i ~ (1-T )r and
c







Table 2: Conditions for final stages.
First remark that on a final stage dividend is issued only íf the per-
sonal tax rates equal each other, which is in complete agreement with
the results of models without personal taxation (Ludwig (1978) and Van
Loon (1983)). Secondly we dístinguish a financial and a fiscal condi-
tion. The first one represents the state of the art, the latter one
specifies the investors' attitude towards the wanted kind of income. The
bigger the difference between the personal tax rates the more he prefers
capital gain instead of dividend. So, based on the financial condition
we discern two different master trajectories bo[h ending with path 3.
The first one occurs if i ~(1-TC)r and is represented by figure 1.
Although debt financing is more expensive than selffinancing the firm
borrows the maxímum amount of debt that is possible given the size of
equity. In case of acquiring more equity only by making more profit, it
is advantageous for the firm to borrow as long as the resulting marginal
cost is less than marginal revenue. In this case, borrowing increases
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Fígure 2. Piaster trajectories íf i~(1- T)r c10
On this path the firm grows at maximum speed in order to realize a maxi-
mum growth of the income stream and thus a maximum i ncrease of the
amount of cheap equíty. At T- t12 the size of the stock of capital
goods is such that
(15)
K~t
K - YX ~ (1-rc) áK - (1-tc)r
At this level it is profitable to use retained earnin~s to pay back debt
money, for
- issuing earnings is valued by the shareholders according the discount
rate i;
- continuing expansion investment yields a net revenue of
d0
(1-ic) áK ~ (1-rc)r.
- paying back debt money saves (1-r )r rent payments per unit. c
So the firm stops its expansion for a whíle in order to use all its in-
come to replace debt equity (path 2).
After this period of consolidation it still makes sense to expand the
amount of capital goods, because it is financed now by equity only.
Recause no dividend is issued the firm starts increasing again as fast
as possible (path 3). In this way the firm reaches the state of maximum
dividend pay-out in a self-financing regime as quick as possible:
(16) K - KX ~ (1-TC) áK - i
At this moment it is useless to continue expansion investments because
additional net cost exceeds net revenue (path 4).
However, a moment T- t43 arrives at which the advantage of the lower
tax ra[e on capital gain (Tg ~ rd) exceeds the drawback of discounting
the salvage value of equity at the end of the planning period. From this
moment no dividend is issued anymore and the firm starts expansion in-
vestments agaín (path 3). It is true, that marginal net revenue is less
than the discount rate. This loss, however, is counterbalanced by the
tax advantage got by the shareholders at the end of the planning period.
As we see, the discount rate not longer equals the cost of equity per
unít.1}
The second optimal master evolution pattern (see figure 2) occurs if
debt money is cheap compared to equity. The start oE the pattern is the
same as the start of the previous one: due to the cheapness of debt
,noney (i ~(1-t )r) the Eirm borrows the maximum amount oE debt that ís
c
possible and invests all money in capital goods in order to realize a
maximum growth of the income stream (path 3).
~
lt is worth investíng at the maximum level till K- KY, because at
~
levels lower than KY the marginal income after taxation exceeds marginal
financíng costs in the case of maximum debt financing.
~
As soon as the amount of capital goods equals KY, thís accelerated
growth is cut off abruptly at T- t51, because marginal net revenue




dK - lfh i } lth
(1-rc)r
Investments fall down to the replacement level and remaining earning are
issued to the shareholders ( path 5). Corresponding with the previous
evolution pattern a moment arrives at which the firm stops dividend pay-
ments and start expansion investments by retaining earnings. Besides
this the Eirm borrows as much as possible because borrowing increases
~
profit and raises the rate of growth till K- KYX (path 1). According to
the case of relatïvely expensive debt, the firm now drops debt to save
(}-TC)r interest payments per unit (path 2) and after that it starts
growing in a self financing regime till the end of the planning periode
(path 3).
The evolution pattern after termination of path 5 depends among others
on the difference between the personal tax rates, in other words: the
tax advantage yielded by the shareholders receiving capital gain instead
of dividend. A lower value of (1-T )~(1-Td) will not only alter the
g
final stage but also postpone the moment T- t51 and decline the number
of stages to pass through.12
5. A further analysis
By now we have described the optímal solution of our model ín a way most
of the publications on dynamics of the firm do. Besídes this we like to
do another way of analysis: a derivation of two global decision rules,
which together constitute the policy of the firm (see Van Loon (1983)):
a) Financial decisions rule.
The financial structure is characterized by the relative amounts of
equity and debt. The latter one is restricted by the first. So, the
financial structure has two extreme cases: the case that the assets
are financed by equity only and the case that the firm is financed by
means of the maximal allowed amount of debt. Which of both is the
optimal one depends on the marginal return to equity. The firm will
try to realize such a financial structure as to maximize marginal
return to equity, which implies:
self financing
~
choose for , if K{~J KYX
` maximum debt ,
b) Dividend~investment decision rule.
The firm can spend its earnings in two ways: to pay out dividend or
to retain it in order to finance investments and~or to pay back debt
money. The last mentioned decision has been discussed ímplicitly in
the previous decision rule: redemption of debt starts as soon as the
~
firm attains the KYXlevel on which self financíng becomes optimal
ínstead of maximum debt financing.
The second possibility is certaintly preferable as long as marginal
return to equity exceeds the discount rate of the shareholders, for
this rate represents the rate of return that the shareholders can
obtain elsewhere. As soon as marginal return to equity equals the
discount rate the firm will in general pay out dividend and ínvest
only on the replacement level.
So far so good, but what happens if the discount rate exceeds marginal
return to equity? In absence of personal taxation one can prove that13
this situation only occurs if the initial amount of equity and capital
goods are too high to make production at that level profitable. Van Loon
(1983) argues that in such a case the optimal policy is to decrease the
capital good stock and to pay out all earnings. We join this statement
but on top oE it the introduction of personal taxation brings on a
second possible situation, which results in an additional dividend~in-
vestment decision rule to point out.
On the stationary stages 4 and 5 the firm has to decide whether it will
continue to issue dividend or start to retain earnings. If we suppose
that the firm holds this earnings only in cash and obtains no revenue
from them, the shareholders value the first possibility by (1-td)e-iT
and the latter one b
-iz
y(1-Tg)e . This means that capital gain on one
hand will be more profitable in view the tax advantage (T ~ id) but on
g
the other hand less due to the time lag z-T ~ 0. So, the decision to




It is obvious that given the values of the tax rates, the discount rate
~
and the planning horizon only one value, i.e. T- tb, will satisfy the
equality of expression (18).
However, this situation í s not the optimal one. In spite of the decrea-
sin1; marginal return on equity expansion investments still acquire pos-
d0
itive revenue 0~(1-TC) dK ~ i, which can be used again to finance more
investments. So, the shareholders will not only receive the retained
dollar earning but also the increasement of equity during the time in-
terval [T,z]. The value of this increasement depends on the leverage of
the firm. As in the optimal solution shareholders value an increasement
of equity and capital goods corresponding the co-state variables, retai-
ning one dollar at time T- t and using it to finance new investments
raises in the case i ~(1-r )r the value of the firm with
c
(19) Jz(V'1(T)tV~2(T))C1-TC) áK dT
T-t14
in which
vely ( see the appendíx).
In a situation of maximum debt financing an increase of equity wíth one
dollar allows a rise of debt with h dollar. So, a retention of one dol-
lar results in an increase of the amount of capital goods with (lfh)
dollar, which use results in a revenue of
(20) (lfh)(1-t ) d0 - hr - ( 1-T ) d0
-1- h(1-r )(d0 - r)
c dK c dK c dK
So in a situation of maximum debt financing a retention of one dollar
earning on the stationary stage raises the value of the firm with
(21)
y~(T) co-state variable to equity and capítal goods respecti-
f(~lf(lfh)V~2)I(1-TC) dK ~- h(1-rc)(áK - r)]dT
Note that no boundaries are indicated as in this situation (i ~(I-T )r)
c
the firm will pass through both stages with maximum as without debt
after termination of the stationary stage.
The discussion above results in the following additional dividend in-
vestment decision rule:
in which
continue to issue dividend and make
only investments on the replacement leve` ~
, if T{~} tb
stop to pay out dividends and spend all
earnings on expansion investments
~
tb is determinated by
- ín the case i ~ (1-T )r
c












Jz(~1}(1-ih)V~Z)I(I-TC) dK f h(1-1c)
~
T-tb
(dK - r)]dT f ( 1-Tg)e-iz
It is possible to show that in absence of personal taxation the
~
point tb equals the planning horizon z, which means that contrary to our
model with diEferent personal taxes the firm issues dividend on a final
stage.
6. Sensitivíty analysis
In this section we study the influence of envíronmental changes on six
different features of the evolution process of the firm. This is a sen-
sitivity analysis concerning parameters that are interesting for econo-
mic analysis: the personal tax rates Td and rg, the corporate tax
rate T, the interest rate r and the díscount rate i. The features of
c
the evolution process are the level of capital goods on the stationary
~
stage K, the speed of growth of equity X, the level of capital gain on
equity, the points in time of start and termination of the stationary
~ ~
stage, ta and tb respectively, and the leverage Y~X.
6.1. Fiscal parameters
a. Corporate taxes
A reduction of the corporate tax rate causes two direct consequences:
- a rise of the net cost of debt due to the tax deductibility;
- possibilities to increase (expansion) investments in view lower tax
payments.
The first one enables a switch of the sign of i ~(1-r )r resulting in a
~ c
policy change of the firm into a low leverage strategy.
Contrary to marginal revenue, however, net marginal costs of finance are
influenced only partially. Thus, such a reduction results into i ncreas-16
ing profits and a larger amount of capital goods on statíonary stages.
A reduction of the corporate tax rate also inereases earnings after tax
payments from which (expansion) investments are to be paid. In this way
growtti gathers speed which is also demonstrated by
(22) - aaX - (0(K)-rY) ~ 0
c -
On top we can derive that such a reduction wíll put forward the termina-
tion point of the stationary stage. No conclusion, however, is possible
with relation tot the start of the stationary stage and the amount of
dividend. because a reduction of the curporate tax rate causes two op-
posite influences: a ríse of the speed of growth and a larger amount of
capital goods to be reached.
The consequences of a rise of the corporate tax rate are summarized in
table 3.
b. Personal tax rates
The impact of changes in the value of the personal tax rates on the fea-
tures of the firm are obvious. A rise of the tax rates on dividend
causes an increasing interest in capital gain finding expression ín put-
~
ting forward the termination point of the stationary stage tb as a
result of a change in final stage showed by table 2. As the speed of
growth does not changes the total amount of net dividend will decline
due to the higher tax payments and the shorter period of issuing divi-
dends by the firm.
A rise of the tax rate on capital gain presents almost the opposite pic-
ture: the stationary stage will grow ín length, but the level of divi-
dend payments after personal taxation does not alter.
On top of the results above table 3 shows the impact of the two fi-nan-




speed oE growth X
capital gain
point oE starting stationary stage ta
point of endíng stationary stage tb
leverage Y~X
Table 3. Results of sensitivity analysis.
in which
rc id r r i
g
- 0 0 - 0
f
? 0 0 ?~f -
t - f t~0 ~-
f- rise of the feature value
t 0 0
-- fall of the fea[ure value
0- no influence on the relevant fea[ure
?- no conclusion possible due to opposite influences
.~. - conclusion before separation sign applies only if




As earlier research has been done in sensitivity analysis with relation
to financial parameters (Van Loon (1983)) we discuss the results only
briefly and refer for a comprehensive discussion to the research men-
tioned.
A rise of the interest rate r causes increasing costs of finance im-
plying a drop i n the speed of growth i n stages with both debt and equi-
ty. In the case of expensive debt compared to equity the termination
point of the stationary stage will be postponed. A switch of the sign
of í~( 1-TC)r resulting í n a change of the policy of the firm belongs
also to the possibilities.ls
A change in the value of the discount rate has no influence on the speed
of growth. The level of the capital goods stock in stationary stages
will decline and the termination point of these paths will be postponed
due to the larger revenue for the investor elsewhere.
6.3. Combined influence of fiscal and financial parameters
As we discussed in earlier sections the discount rate expresses the rate
of return after taxation that the shareholders can obtain elsewhere. In
a deterministic framework this implies that the discount rate depends on
the market interest rate and the personal tax rate on ordínary income.
As in most of the tax regimes the tax rate on dividend is positively
correlated with the tax rate on ordinary income we can write
(23) i- i(Td.r) aT ~ 0 áY ~ 0
d
Considering this dependence we will once more study the impact of the
tax rate on dividend on the features of the optimal evolution patterns
of the firm by means of two extreme cases.
First we assume that the tax rate on dividend of investor A, rdA, dif-
fers much from the tax rate on capital gain r and has such a value that
g
(24) iA - iA(TdA'r) ~ (1-rc)r
According to the Miller hypothesis these investors would prefer firms
following a low leverage strategy, low dividend payments and high capi-
tal gains. With relation to our model figure 3 represents the optimal
evolutión pattern.
In the second case we assume that the tax rate on capital gain remaines
the same, but the tax rate on dividend of investor B, TdB, differs only
líttle and has such a value that
(25) iB ~ ( 1-TC)r and (1-r )~(1-r ) ~ i ~(1-T )r
g dB B c19
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Figure 4. Master trajectories if iB ~(1-TC)r and
1 ~(1-T )í(1-T ) ~ i í(1-r )r
g dB B czo
in which
iB - iBiTdB~r) ~ iA
Table 2 shows that under these circums[ances the optimal evolution pat-
tern, represented by figure 4, will end with path 1. In the opinion of
investor B the firm has to choose for a high leverage strategy and has
to issue as much dividend as possible. Similar to the Miller hypothesis
we discover clear differences between these two optimal master trajec-
tories. On top of this similarity the Miller hypothesís is enlarged by
the introduction of dynamics: investors in low tax brackets prefer not
only a high leverage strategy and dividend above capital gain, but they
also like to receive earnings as quick as possible, while inves[ors in
high tax brackets are wílling to postpone earnings in view their tax
advantage and discount rate.21
7. Summary
In this paper we considered especially the influence of tax systems on
the optimal dynamic policy of the firm by introducing both corporate and
personal taxation. In this way we extended the dynamic theory of the
Eirm and we did a first investigation on the relevance of financial
leverage clienteles in a dynamic framework.
After presentation of the model we derived an analytical solution using
'optimal control' techniques. The results differ from those of dynamic
models without personal taxation in three ways:
- in final stages no dividend will be issued;
- at last the firm finances investments with only equity, even when debt
is cheap compared to equity;
- the discount rate of the shareholders equals no longer the marginal
cos[ of equity which enables the firm to invest in projects with a net
return less than the discount rate.
Sensitivity analysis showed the impact of the personal tax rates and
other parameters on six features of the optimal master trajectories. As
we assumed that the discount rate depends on the interest rate and the
personal tax rate on dividend we saw similarities with the results of
static models. Especially the Miller hypothesis seems to be confirmed:
shareholders in high tax brackets prefer a policy of low dividend pay-
ments and hígh capital gains by retaining earnings.
Contrary to Miller we did not yet consider market equilibriurn situa-
tions, at which we will pay attention in future contributions.?2
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Appendix. A reduced form of the model and its conditions for optimality.
In order to simplify the solution procedure, we will fírst leave out a
mathematically superflous element in the formulation (6)-(11) by elimi-
nating the control variable Y. We can rewrite (9) in:
(0.1) Y - K - X
Subsitution of the above expression in (6) through (11) results in the
next reduced form of the model:
z
(0.2) max (1-Td) f De iTdT t(1-Tg)X(z)e-iz
I,D T-0
(0.3) X - (1-TC)(0(K)-rKfrX) - D
(0.4) K - I -aK
(0.5) K - X ~ 0
(0.6) (lth)X - K ~ 0
(0.7) D ~ 0
(0.8) X ~ 0
Combining expressions (0.5) and (0.6) however makes ( 0.8) superflous, so
we will leave it out.
Let the Hamiltonian be
(0.9) H - (1-td)e-iTD }
(~2fu1-u2)(I-aK) t
(~1-Vlt(lfh)u2)((1-rc)(0(K)-rKtrX) - D]
and let the Lagrangian be25
(~).l0) L - H t all
in which
y~j t~j(T) adjoint variable or co-state variable which denotes
the marginal contribution of the j-th level state
variable to the performance level
a-~(T) dynamic Lagrange multiplier representing the dynamic
'shadow price' of the dividend restriction
uR - uR(T) artificial variable.
To fínd the optimal solution we now apply the theorems for necessary and
sufficient conditions as presented by Van Loon (1983, pp. 139-141).
~ ~
For an optimal control history (D ,I ) of the problem formulated by
(0.2) through (0.7) and the resulting state trajectory (K~,X~) to be
optiinal, it is necessary that there are functions ~j(T), a(T) and uR(T)
such that:
~ ~ ~ ~
Hoptimal '- H(K ,X ,D ,I ,y~j,a,uQ,T)
- maxímum{H(K~,X~,D,I,~y ,a,uR,T)}
D,I
for each T, 0 G T G z
j
~ ~
and, except at points of discontinuity of (D ,I ):
(o.ll) V'1 - - aX - -í~l-ult(lth)u2)(1-tc)r
(0.12) ~Y2 - - áK - (~YI-ult(1~-h)u2)C1-ic)(r- áK) t (~Z~f-ul-u2)a
(O.13) á~ - (1-rd)e-iT - (V~1-ult(lth)u2) t a - 0
(O.14)
aI -~2 t ul - u2 - 026
(0.15) V~1(z) - (1-ig)e-iz
(0.16) ~y2(z) - 0
(0.17) ul(z)[K(z) - X(z)] - 0
(0.18) u2(z)[(ifh)X(z) - K(z)] - 0
ul(K-X)





(0.20) ~~(T) are continuous with piecewise continuous derivatives
(0.21) a(T) i s non-negative and continuous on intervals of continuity
of {D,I}
(0.22) ul(T) is continuous when (K-X) is discontinuoiis
(0.23) u2(T) in continuous when ( lth)X - K is díscontinuous
(0.24) uR(T) is continuous on intervals of continuity of {D,I}, not
negative and not increasing
As H is a concave function of (K,X) these conditions are also optimal
sufficient.
From these conditions we can derive that uR(T) and a(T) are continuous
functions.
Combining (0.22) and (0.24) then ul(T) is continuous
(0.25) if { D,I} continuous and~or ( K-X) discontinuous.We can rewrite (0.25) with (0.2) and (0.3) into
(0.26) if {D,I} continuous and~or
I-(1-t )(0-rX) t D-[(1-T )r f a]K discontinuous
c c
Due tu the closed control region, X and K are continuous, so at least
one of the control variables must be discontinuous in order to get a
discontinuity of expression (0.26).
So the two parts of expression (0.26) are complementary to each other
and (0.25) wi11 always be fulfilled.
We may conclude that ul is continuous in the above optimality condi-
tions.
In the same way we can derive the continuity of u2 and with the help of
(0.13) and (0.20) the continuity of a.
Example of final stage
path 5: V1 -~- 0, V2 ~ 0, Y- hX, D~ 0, K~ 0.
if path 5 will be final stage it has to fulfill the transversality
conditions (0.15)-(0.18). Therefore
(O.15') ~1(z) - (1-rg)e
-iz
(0.16' ) y~2(z) - 0
(0.17') ul(z) - 0 as K(z) - X(z) - Y(z) ~ 0
(0.18') V2 ~ 0 as (lfh)X(z) - K(z) - 0
Substitution of these necessary conditions in (0.13) and (0.14) gíves:
(0.13') (1-td)e-iz - (1-iR)e-iz - (lth)V2(z) - 0za
(0.14') u2(z) - 0
which means that path 5 can be final stage only if rd - r.
g
Example of coupling procedure
To couple two paths we use the continuity properties of relevant
variables.
Problem: on which conditions can path S precede the string path 1 t path
2 ~ path 3?
We have to consider especially the continuity property of a as this
variable is positive on path 1 and equal to zero on path 5. So, a can
only be continuous if
(0.27) a ~ 0 when a- 0 on path 1.
From (0.11)-(0.14) we can derive
(0.28) a~(lfh) - -(1-r )e-iT~(1-r )(d~ - h r) 1 d c dK, lfh - lth 1~
- a(1-TC)~dK
- 1~-h r~'
So (0.27) can be fulfilled if
(0.29) (1-TC) dK ~ lfh r} 1-fh t
which means that on path 1 holds
~
(0.30) K(T) ~ K .
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